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The paper identifies key labor market and institutional differences between developed and 
developing countries, analyzes how these differences affect the working of the standard, 
OECD-style unemployment insurance (UI) program, and derives a desirable design of 
unemployment benefit program in developing countries. It argues that these countries – 
faced by large informal sector, weak administrative capacity, large political risk, and 
environment prone to corruption – should tailor the OECD-style UI program to suit their 
circumstances. To minimize employment disincentives, to ensure affordability, and to 
minimize administration cots, such adaptations include: (i) relying on self-insurance (via 
unemployment insurance savings accounts – UISAs) as a main source of financing and 
complementing it by solidarity funding; (ii) simplifying monitoring of job-search behavior and 
labor market status, and even eliminating personal monitoring of continuing eligibility 
requirements in the early phases; (iii) keeping modest benefits both in terms of the 
replacement rate and potential benefit duration; (iv) drawing on employers’ and workers’ 
contributions as sources of financing; and (v) piggybacking on existing networks to administer 
benefits. Particularly attractive is the UISAs-cum-borrowing version that uses pension wealth 
as collateral, making the system proof to moral hazard and strategic behavior, and allowing it 
to be rapidly deployed, such as in response to the currently emerging global economic crises. 
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unemployed in developed countries.
 In these countries, it typically offers good protection:  
it covers the majority of employed persons, irrespective of occupation or industry, and 
provides adequate smoothening of consumption patterns.  For example, studies on the U.S. 
find that the welfare of benefit recipient households is on average only 3-8 percent lower 
than the welfare of otherwise identical households (Hamermesh and Sleznick, 1995), and 
that in the absence of unemployment insurance, average consumption expenditures would 
fall by about 20 percent (Gruber, 1997).  In the last two decades, transition countries also 
introduced UI programs, and their use in developing countries is on the rise as well. 
 
The incidence of unemployment benefit programs is strongly related to the level of 
development of a country (see Vodopivec, 2004). But prompted by increased exposure to 
foreign markets and fearing future global crises, more developing countries (including 
lower middle-income countries such as the Philippines and Sri Lanka) are contemplating 
introducing UI. Such considerations are bolstered by the prospect of efficiency and 
distributive advantages of reforming social protection programs for workers in developing 
countries. Namely, in many developing countries the balance between job and worker 
protection is tilted in the favor of the former: virtually all have – typically very restrictive – 
severance pay programs, and very few have UI programs. It is often argued that removing 
excessive job protection would not only boost the creation of more and better jobs, but also 
improve job prospects for vulnerable groups (see, of example, Heckman and Pages 2000). 
And it goes without saying that reducing job protection is an extremely sensitive task that 
can often only be implemented if accompanied by introducing or strengthening income 
protection programs for workers – UI being one of them. 
 
Obvious – and difficult – questions thus arise: when is a country ready to introduce an UI 
program? What factors influence successful operation of the program, and how to adjust 
the design of the program – the coverage, eligibility rules, the generosity of benefit, 
structure of incentives, and monitoring? In particular, how should factors such as lack of 
administrative capacity, large size of informal sector, and the profoundly different nature 
of unemployment of developing countries be accounted for? 
 
To address these questions, the paper identifies key labor market and institutional 
differences between developed and developing countries, analyzes how these differences 
affect the working of the standard, OECD-style unemployment insurance program, and 
derives a desirable design of unemployment benefit program in developing countries. It 
argues that developing countries – faced by large informal sector, weak administrative 
capacity, large political risk, and environment prone to corruption – should tailor the 
OECD-style UI program to suit their circumstances. To minimize employment 
disincentives, to ensure affordability, and to minimize administration cots, such 
adaptations include: (i) relying on self-insurance (via unemployment insurance savings 
accounts – UISAs) as a main source of financing and complementing it by solidarity 
funding; (ii) simplifying monitoring of job-search behavior and labor market status, and 
even eliminating personal monitoring of continuing eligibility requirements in the early 
phases;  (iii) keeping modest benefits both in terms of the replacement rate and potential 
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financing; and (v) piggybacking on existing networks to administer benefits. Particularly 
attractive is the UISAs-cum-borrowing version that uses pension wealth as the collateral, 
making the system proof to moral hazard and strategic behavior, and allowing it to be 
rapidly deployed, such as in response to the currently emerging global economic crises.   
 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 1 describes the UI program, 
summarizes its key strengths and weaknesses, and discusses its income protection and 
efficiency properties as established in developed countries.  Section 2 discusses how to 
adjust the program to account for specific conditions that characterize developing 
countries, and Section 3 reviews the experience with UI programs by transition and 
developing countries. Section 4 provides a case study of designing a suitable UI program 
for a developing country – Sri Lanka, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
1.  Income Protection and Efficiency Impact of UI  
 
Below we describe the stylized features of UI program as practiced around the world and 
summarize the program’s key strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, to provide 
“benchmarks” for the analysis that follows, we also summarize both income protection and 
efficiency effects of UI programs in developed countries.   
  
In developed countries, UI is provided, together with pension and health insurance, as part 
of – publicly provided – social insurance. Unemployment insurance is publicly provided 
primarily because its functioning is affected by strong information asymmetries – which 
give rise to the so-called moral hazard and adverse selection problems – that cannot be 
handled by private providers. Moral hazard arises because UI reduces self-protection; 
adverse selection arises because information problems prevent insurers to charge higher 
premiums to bad risks than to poor risks. Correcting for market failures calls not only for 
regulation – obligatory membership to avoid the problem of adverse selection, but also for 
its public provision, to improve monitoring capacity and financial sustainability of the 
program.  Another advantage of its public provision is the enhanced ability to pool 
resources across large groups, which reduces strains on the program arising from the 
covariant nature of unemployment risk.  Moreover, financial backing by the government is 
often provided when the program faces financial difficulties. 
 
The program typically requires that workers and their employers pay earnings-related 
contributions which, upon separation, entitle workers to unemployment benefits according 
to predetermined eligibility conditions. While it mimics market insurance, the program 
deviates from actuarial principles by charging premiums which do not reflect individual 
risks. In developed countries, UI is mandatory and the most widely used income protection 
program for the unemployed, typically covering all workers. To qualify for benefits, the 
worker must satisfy the minimum covered employment or contribution requirement. The 
cause of dismissal may affect the individual’s eligibility for benefits, with quitters often 
being disqualified. Continuing eligibility requires that applicants are available for and 
willing to take a job, and that they actively search for it. Benefits are typically a proportion 
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usually between 40 and 75 percent of average earnings (see Table 1 for more details about 
national UI programs).  
 
When thinking about transferability of UI to developing countries, it is important to have 
in mind the origin of social insurance. Namely, social insurance is a response of the 
modern, industrial society to the changing nature of the labor market, above all, to the 
development of a modern employment relationship (Atkinson, 1995). In an industrialized 
and urbanized society, employment becomes a “discrete” event: workers either work or do 
not work. This development has strong implications for unemployment – if they cannot 
find a job in wage employment (working for others), workers are unable to resort to self- 
or home-production, because they are divorced from ownership of means of production.  
Similarly, older and less productive workers in industrialized societies stop working 
altogether once their productivity drop substantially, whereas under different labor market 
conditions of traditional societies they continue to be economically active as long as they 
produce something valuable.  Thus the “invention” of unemployment and the changing 
nature of retirement created the need to insure against the new non-employment 
contingences.  In other words, social insurance is based on the concepts of unemployment 
and retirement as specific social constructs. 
 
The key strengths of the UI program are as follows (Vodopivec, 2004): 
•  Because it pools resources across a wide base, it provides good protection – enabling 
strong consumption smoothing – for all covered workers. 
•  It performs well under all types of shocks. 
•  By automatically injecting additional resources and reducing taxes in times of 
recessions, UI acts as an automatic stabilizer and thus moderates the magnitude of the 
economic downturn. 
•  It encourages the emergence or expansion of more risky jobs and/or industries, which 
may increase efficiency (Acemoglu and Shimer 1999, 2000).  
 
The above strengths have to be weighed against the following main weaknesses of the 
program: 
•  The program creates reemployment disincentives and wage pressures, which increase 
the equilibrium unemployment rate of the economy (see, for example, Holmlund, 
1998). 
•  By interacting with adverse shocks, the program contributes to the persistence of 
unemployment (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). 
•  It may create large unfunded liabilities, which creates the need of the government to 
subsidize the program. 
•  The protection is limited to formal sector workers only. 
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The main objective of income unemployment benefit programs is to compensate workers 
for the loss of income when they become unemployed. Below we evaluate two key aspects 
of such protection: coverage and adequacy. We pay particular attention to programs in 
transition countries, most of them introduced in the beginning of the 1990s, which offer 
most valuable lessons for developing countries contemplating introducing such programs.   
 
Coverage  
In industrial countries, most workers are protected by several income support programs 
(for a review of income support programs for the unemployed around the world, see 
Vodopivec 2004 and Vroman and Brusentsev, 2005). Most UI programs are government 
mandated and cover all employees; many exclude the self-employed and some other 
groups, such as agricultural workers and household workers. Note that coverage by 
legislated severance pay also tend to be widespread, and that industrial countries also offer 
social assistance programs that provide assistance of last resort. In most countries these 
programs are open-ended in duration. Industrial countries also offer other types of income 
support programs (early retirement, public works, training, employment subsidies), which 
are usually targeted to specific groups.  
 
In transition countries, UI covers most of the labor force (and workers are also usually 
eligible for severance pay). Unemployment benefits represented an important source of 
income in these countries in the mid-1990s (Vodopivec 2004). As  many as 78 percent of 
households in Hungry and 65 percent of households in Poland with at least one 
unemployed worker received unemployment benefits; the share in other countries was 
lower, particularly in Estonia and Latvia, where just 17–19 percent of such households 
received unemployment benefits. Interestingly, among households with at least one 
unemployed member, the receipt of unemployment benefits was less prevalent among poor 
households, except in Estonia. 
 
Because of a large informal sector, UI tends to cover only a part of the workforce in 
developing countries – and is available in only a small number of developing countries. 
For example,  only about 60 percent of all wage workers in the Republic of Korea were 
covered in 1999, four years after the program’s introduction (Hur 2001), and in 2003 still 
less than a third of the workforce was covered. In the late 1990s, only 40 percent of urban 
workers were covered in Brazil, and unemployment insurance savings accounts covered 47 
percent of urban workers in Colombia (de Ferranti and others 2000).  
 
Unemployed workers may also qualify for other income support programs. Unemployment 
assistance is available in some transition economies after beneficiaries exhaust UI benefits, 
as are early retirement programs. Social assistance is rarely available in developing 
countries; if it is, it is often provided on a one-time basis. Workers may also benefit from 
public sector retrenchment programs. In the absence of social assistance, public works 
programs provide assistance of last resort, although such programs are often not available 
to all potential beneficiaries. In Mexico training is used as a form of assistance of last 
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Recently, other innovative programs have emerged, including unemployment insurance 
savings accounts and social funds. In response to economic crises, countries may also 
introduce temporary programs such as the Emergency Loan Facility available to displaced 
workers in the Philippines, where workers obtain loans contingent on their previous 
payments into the social security fund (Esguerra and others, 2001).  
 
Adequacy of Support 
Replacement rates and the entitlement duration of unemployment benefit programs as well 
as the consumption-smoothing and poverty-reduction effects of income support programs 
are examined to gauge the elusive concept of adequacy of support. 
 
Replacement Rates and Potential Entitlement Duration. Replacement rates differ widely 
across countries. In most industrial countries they are 40–75 percent, and in the Nordic 
countries they are even higher (the replacement rate in Denmark is 90 percent). In the 
United States a broad consensus has emerged that an adequate income replacement rate is 
50 percent (O’Leary 1997). The replacement rates in developing countries and transition 
economies are mostly in the range of 45–70 percent, although there are notable exceptions. 
In the late 1990s through 2003, for example, Estonia offered flat-rate benefits of less than 
10 percent of the average wage (Vodopivec, Wörgötter, and Raju 2005).  
 
The range of the maximum entitlement duration of benefits is also very large. In industrial 
countries it ranges from six months to indefinite. In developing countries and transition 
economies, it ranges from 6 months to 24 months (with some extensions close to 
retirement age).  
 
A summary measure—the net (after-tax) replacement rate—that combines income received 
from various programs confirms the generous nature of income protection in industrial 
countries. On average OECD countries offer more than 60 percent of expected earnings in 
work; some countries (Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland) offer 
more than 80 percent (Martin and Grubb 2001).
1 The United States, which provides net 
replacement of just 34 percent, and Greece, with a net replacement rate of just over 10 
percent, are at the bottom among OECD countries.  
 
Given the wide differences in the replacement rate and the entitlement duration, a better 
comparison of adequacy is obtained by combining the two measures in an “index of 
generosity.” The index of generosity is defined as the product of the replacement rate and 
the share of benefit recipients in the total number of unemployed times 100. It equals the 
cost of unemployment benefits per percentage point of unemployment (Vroman and 
                                                 
1 This summary measure takes into account the support provided not only by unemployment benefits but also 
by other welfare programs and active programs, including social assistance and family, housing, 
employment-conditional, and single-parent benefits. It is calculated for a period of more than 60 months for 
four different household types (single, married couple, couple with two children, and a single parent with two 
children) and two alternative earnings possibilities (an average production worker and one earning two-thirds 
of the average).  
  5Brusentsev 2005). By this measure, on average unemployment benefit programs in 
transition economies lag significantly behind benefits in OECD countries, but there are 
substantial variations within the two groups of countries (see Vroman and Brusentsev 
2005, and Vodopivec, Wörgötter, and Raju 2005). Among European transition economies 
in the 1990s, the most generous unemployment benefits were provided in Slovenia and 
Hungary (and in Poland until 1996); the least generous were in Estonia.  
 
Consumption-Smoothing and Poverty-Reduction Effects.  Research on industrial countries 
(primarily the United States) suggests that unemployment benefits effectively smooth 
consumption. Hamermesh and Sleznick (1995) find that the welfare of benefit recipient 
households was on average only 3–8 percent lower than the welfare of otherwise identical 
households. Gruber (1997) finds that in the absence of unemployment insurance, average 
consumption expenditures would fall by 22 percent. Vary rare studies examine the 
consumption-smoothing effects of income support programs in developing countries. One 
notable study is Kugler (2002), showing that withdrawals from unemployment insurance 
savings accounts in Colombia increased consumption by nonemployed household heads.  
 
Somewhat surprisingly, evidence also suggests that unemployment benefits can strongly 
reduce poverty.
2 In particular, in the mid-1990s unemployment benefit programs 
contributed substantially to poverty reduction in European transition economies—an 
unexpected finding given that reducing poverty is not one of the stated goals of 
unemployment benefits. The effects were strongest in Hungary and Poland. In Hungary 
poverty among the unemployed fell more than 50 percent; in Poland it declined 45 percent 
(Vodopivec et at 2005). In Hungary 5.2 percent of the total population was drawn out of 
poverty by unemployment benefits; in Poland the figure was 3.5 percent. Benefits reduced 
poverty among the unemployed in other countries as well, albeit less significantly. Poverty 
fell 31 percent in the Slovak Republic, 16 percent in Slovenia, 9 percent in Latvia, and 5 
percent in Estonia. These strong effects reflect both the favorable distributive properties of 
unemployment benefit programs and the small poverty gap in these countries.  
Efficiency Effects 
 
By providing protection against unemployment risk, UI increases the sense of security 
among employed workers and provides financial compensation to workers who lose their 
jobs. This protection obviously brings welfare gains, but questions arise: are these gains 
produced at a cost, and, if so, what are the costs and how large are they? 
 
The introduction of a UI program changes the opportunity cost of leisure and that, together 
with a variety of other channels, may affect employment decisions, labor-force 
participation, and unemployment.  UI may influence job-search intensity, post-
unemployment wages, the labor supply of other family members, and the choice between 
entering regular versus informal jobs.  The program may also interact with adverse shocks, 
contributing to the persistence of unemployment. And by interfering with the allocation 
                                                 
2 Another social protection program that has also shown large scope for reducing poverty is public works (see 
the review by Subbarao, 2003). 
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– by influencing enterprise restructuring and layoff decisions, for example.  
 
Effects on unemployment 
 Benefits affect unemployment through two main channels.  First, they influence job-
search effort and the reservation wage of recipients. This may either prolong 
unemployment spells by making leisure more attractive, or shorten them by providing 
additional resources and thus enabling more effective job search. Second, unemployment 
benefits improve the bargaining position of workers. This leads to higher wages and hence 
a higher equilibrium unemployment (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000).  
 
These ambiguous predictions from theoretical models make empirical studies particularly 
relevant. And, by and large, they show that unemployment benefits increase 
unemployment (for a recent summary, see Calmfors and Holmlund, 2000). Many studies 
of individual countries (using microdata) find that both a higher level and a longer duration 
of benefits increase unemployment, suggesting the presence of the moral hazard problem 
in the job search of benefit recipients (direct evidence on the intensity of job search by 
benefits claimants is scarce and inconclusive). As for the size of these effects, Layard et al 
(1991) estimate that the elasticity of the duration of unemployment spell with regard to 
benefit level ranges from 0.2 to 0.9, depending on the state of the labor market and the 
country concerned. As for the elasticity of unemployment spell duration with regard to 
potential benefit duration, for U.S. Katz and Meyer (1990) showed that one-week increase 
in the potential benefit duration was associated with one day increase in the average 
unemployment spell of recipients, and, according to Card and Levine (2000), with a 0.5 
day increase. For Austria, Lalive and Zweimuller (2004) report that the increase in the 
potential benefit duration was associated with 0.4 day increase in the average 
unemployment spell of recipients, and for Slovenia van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) report 
a 1.4 day increase in the average unemployment spell of recipients. 
 
Some studies (particularly in Europe) find insignificant effects of UI on unemployment, 
but most observers agree that the evidence on positive effects is more compelling. The 
evidence based on microstudies is particularly credible. Many studies, in both developed 
and transition countries, find a positive elasticity of unemployment with respect to the 
level and duration of benefits (for the evidence on developed economies, see Devine and 
Keifer, 1991, and on transition economies, see below). Moreover, disincentives created by 
unemployment benefits show up clearly in a pronounced spike in the probability of exit 
from unemployment just before benefit exhaustion. And unemployment-insurance 
experiments in the U.S. also provide strong evidence of moral hazard: those unemployed 
who were offered a bonus for fast re-employment significantly reduced their 
unemployment spells, without affecting their re-employment earnings (Meyer, 1995).   
 
Apart from increasing the equilibrium level of unemployment, unemployment benefits also 
make unemployment more persistent.  That is, economies with unemployment benefits 
experience larger and more prolonged unemployment following a transient shock. 
Theoretic models argue that the ’non-UI’ economy recovers more rapidly as reservation 
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The interaction of institutions with adverse shocks also offers an explanation for the rise of 
European unemployment in the last several decades (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). 
 
Effects on post-unemployment outcomes 
How do unemployment benefits affect quality of post-unemployment jobs? Ehrenberg and 
Oaxaca (1976), Burgess and Kingston (1976), Hoelen (1977), and Barron and Mellow 
(1979) find a statistically significant and positive relationship between benefit levels and 
post-unemployment wages.
3  But Classen (1977), Blau and Robins (1986), Kiefer and 
Neumann (1989), and Addison and Blackburn (2000) find a weak or negligible effect on 
post-unemployment wages. Meyer (1995) finds that re-employment bonuses shortened the 
duration of compensated unemployment without affecting post-unemployment wages. 
There is also mixed evidence about the effects of unemployment benefits on the duration 
of post-unemployment jobs. Böheim and Taylor (2002), Centeno (2004), and Tatsiramos 
(2006) find that a more generous UI program is positively related to post-unemployment 
job tenure, but Portugal and Addison (2003) find no evidence that unemployment benefits 
facilitated entry into stable jobs in Portugal, and Belzil (2001) finds a negative correlation 
between unemployment duration and subsequent job duration for Canada. Finally, Card et 
al. (2006) and  van Ours and Vodopivec (2008) find that extending the duration of 
potential benefits lengthens the spell of unemployment but has little or no effect on the 
quality of subsequent job matches (for Austria and Slovenia, respectively). 
 
Effects on labor force participation 
The effects of unemployment benefits on labor force participation are not well researched. 
Some studies find that the existence of UI in OECD countries attracts specific groups – for 
example, women and older workers – into the labor force. With the increase of the fringe 
benefits, these groups find labor force participation more valuable - the so-called 
‘entitlement effect.’ But there is conflicting evidence as to whether the entitlement effect 
increases employment. Some studies find that the increase in labor-force participation and 
the increase of unemployment cancel each other, with no net effect on employment. For 
the U.S., however, there is evidence that benefits increase both employment and 
unemployment rates. Particularly in the context of developing countries, it is also 
important to realize that uninsured transient shocks may reduce individual consumption 
below a threshold needed to retain productivity and labor force attachment, and may thus 
give rise to “dynamic poverty traps” and lead to chronic poverty (Ravallion, 2003).   
 
UI also affects the labor supply provided by family members of benefit recipients.  In 
theory, more generous benefit rates suppress the labor supply of other family members 
because they reduce the family’s need for replacement income, the so-called ‘income 
effect.’ Empirical evidence confirms such predictions.  For example, research in the U.S. 
shows that the labor supply of wives of unemployed workers is responsive to 
                                                 
3 Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) estimate that a 10-percentage-point increase in the benefit replacement rate 
increases post-unemployment wages by 7% for older men and 1.5% for older women. Using New Zealand 
data, Maani (1993) finds that a 10-percentage-point increase in the benefit replacement rate is associated with 
a 4.5% increase in post-unemployment wages. 
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benefits of a husband reduces the earnings of his wife by 36 cents (Gruber 1999). 
 
Effects on output and growth  
The effects of UI on output and growth have not been well researched, let alone quantified. 
The predictions of theoretical models about the effects on output conflict. Some argue that, 
by mitigating their greater unemployment risk, UI programs can support the creation of 
high-quality, high-wage jobs. Thus, UI may help the economy achieve higher output.   
More generous benefits are also expected to help workers acquire more specialized skills, 
which may enhance efficiency. Other researchers argue that government-mandated 
programs may break down the social fabric that maintains private transfers and reduce 
private transfers by more than the amount of the publicly provided insurance benefits, 
thereby hurting the efficiency of the economy. Recent empirical evidence from OECD 
countries indeed suggests that these effects cancel each other: using difference-in-
differences method, OECD (2007) finds that generosity of unemployment benefits has no 
significant long-run impact on the level of GDP per capita. 
 
Similarly, the effects of benefits on growth are not well documented, but empirical studies 
suggest they are insignificant (Nickell and Layard, 1999).  One way that UI might 
influence growth is by encouraging labor reallocation and, in particular, enterprise 
restructuring. Partial-equilibrium results suggest this to be the case. For the U.S., there is 
considerable empirical evidence that the availability of benefits strongly increases the 
probability of temporary layoffs, but not of quits and permanent layoffs.  Apparently, when 
considering temporary layoffs, employers do take into account the availability of UI.  
 
These partial-equilibrium results do not necessarily carry over to the general-equilibrium 
framework.  Theoretical modeling does not support the argument that restructuring could 
be facilitated by more generous unemployment benefits: while such benefits might add to 
the attractiveness of restructuring, they also hinder job creation because they make it more 
costly (Blanchard, 1997).  Similarly, in the context of a job creation/job destruction model, 
an increase in the UI program’s income-replacement rate reduces job creation and thus 
aggregate output (Mortensen, 1994).  Therefore, the overall potential of income support 
programs to spur enterprise restructuring is likely to be limited.  
 
Finally, let us emphasize that UI acts as an automatic macroeconomic stabilizer.  
Unemployment benefits soften the impact of adverse shocks on GDP – and, by the same 
token, they also restrain expansion when the economy starts growing again. During 
downturns, unemployment benefit payments increase and UI taxes fall, and the net 
injection of purchasing power moderates the severity of the contraction.  During upturns, 
however, UI taxes increase and UI benefits decrease, restraining the expansion.  Empirical 
evidence in North America shows that UI reduces GDP losses during downturns by 10-15 
percent (Chimerine et al, 1999).  
 
To summarize, unemployment benefits increase the duration of unemployment spells of 
recipients (evidence from single-country studies) and contribute to higher equilibrium 
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effects is not firmly established. Benefits also contribute to the persistence of 
unemployment. Their effects on restructuring and growth are less researched and are 
probably not significant, except for the positive effects arising from the macroeconomic 
stabilization function of the benefits. The evidence on some other effects – for example, on 
the impacts of benefits on post-unemployment wages – is also inconclusive. There seems 
to be mounting and persuasive evidence of the negative efficiency effects of UI, much 
more so than of the positive effects. However, the magnitude of these effects has not been 
precisely determined and is undoubtedly influenced by a host of country-specific features.  
 
2.  How to Account for Specific Conditions of Developing Countries? 
 
UI program functions well under favorable labor market conditions and a suitable 
institutional support – but, as we showed, protection may be provided at the expense of 
efficiency. Below we argue that circumstances enabling successful working of the UI 
program are less favorable in developing countries and that if introduced, the program has 
to be tailored according to local circumstances, thus deviating from a standard, OECD-
style UI program. 
 
The most important circumstances which dictate deviations from a standard UI program 
are the low stage of development of the labor market and weak administrative capacity.  In 
developed countries, UI has emerged in response to the developments of the labor market, 
specifically, the emergence of the unemployment as a “discrete event.”  In important ways, 
labor market conditions in developing countries – particularly the prevalence of large 
informal sector – make unemployment more a “continuous” variable, with important 
consequences for the design of unemployment insurance. Moreover, the administrative 
capacity of developing countries (even in upper-middle income group) lags behind the 
capacity of developed countries, which is likely to worsen the efficiency properties of UI 
program.  
 
Below we elaborate on these key circumstances and suggest adaptations of the standard UI 
program when being transferred to developing countries. We argue that such adaptations 
include self-insurance (personal savings) as a main source of financing, to be 
complemented by solidarity funding, and the simplification of eligibility conditions – even 
elimination of personal monitoring of continuing benefit eligibility, perhaps as a transitory 
measure. At the same time, such simplifications would make the administration of benefit 
claims much more straightforward and would enhance the possibilities of piggybacking the 
existing administrative networks.  
Adapting UI to the undeveloped labor market 
Below we elaborate on key labor market characteristics that developing countries should 
consider when designing their UI programs. We argue that these characteristics are the 
“non-discrete” nature of unemployment and the fact that the poor are less than 
proportionally represented among the unemployed. We show that under these 
circumstances, the standard, OECD type of UI program would inhibit self-protection as a 
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and bring regressive redistribution. To respond to these problems, we propose that the 
design of UI should be changed to exempt working in informal sector from disqualifying 
conditions for continuing eligibility; drop conventional monitoring of continuing 
eligibility, and rely exclusively on  employers’ and workers’ contributions as sources of 
financing, that is, refrain from using government subsidies for financing of UI. 
 
Key labor market features of developing countries relevant for UI 
(i) Unemployment as a “non-discrete” event. In contrast to developed countries, in 
developing countries a large proportion of the workforce is “partly unemployed” –   
underemployed, and the entry to informal employment, and exit from it, is easy (there are 
low capital requirements and reputation costs).  The prevalence of underemployment can 
be explained by the fact that transition from underemployment to open unemployment can 
be viewed as an income effect. Unemployment is virtually nonexistent in traditional 
societies, where individuals cannot afford to be jobless and therefore they undertake any 
type of work, even work that leaves them underemployed or that is unsuitable for their 
skills. In other words, rather than waiting to find a “good” job, workers in developing 
countries undertake any type of job – self-protection emerges as their dominant strategy in 
dealing with risk of unemployment.
4  
 
Another reason why unemployment in developing countries is a “non-discrete event” is the 
fact that the informal sector is these countries is much larger and imposes low entry and 
exit costs (as opposed to often prohibitive costs of entry in the informal sector of 
developed countries). Low-cost entry to and exit from informal employment can be 
explained by low capital requirements due to low labor  productivity in general, but very 
importantly, also by few institutional constraints imposed on forming self-employment or 
employment relationship.  In contrast, developed countries impose large costs of entry – 
through taxation, sanitary as well as health and safety regulations, zoning rules, and 
licensing – for many occupations, including those that in developing countries flourish in 
the informal sector (such as retail trade, transportation, various household services and 
repair). 
 
(ii) The unemployed are not necessarily poor.  The second feature of unemployment which 
is important for the design of the UI program in developing countries is the fact that in 
these countries, the members of poor households may be less than proportionally 
represented in the ranks of the unemployed (Cox Edwards and Manning, 2001). For 
example, in Peru and Brazil, the poor show disproportionately less unemployment than the 
rich; while the pattern is reversed in Mexico and Uruguay, unemployment is still heavily 
represented among richer quintiles (de Ferranti et al, 2000). Moreover, in the Philippines in 
1997, only 12.1 percent of the households whose heads were unemployed were poor, in 
comparison to a 25 percent poverty incidence in general (Esguerra et al, 2001). Although 
                                                 
4In words of Cox Edwards and Manning (2001, p.346): “The transition from widespread underemployment 
to open unemployment is in part an income effect. As countries grow and household incomes rise, jobless 
workers are able to endure periods without work while waiting for a job to open.” 
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the total population, its contribution to the total number of poor persons was only 6.1 
percent.  Similarly, in Sri Lanka unemployment has been closely related to the status in the 
household and the availability of income support from relatives, both critical factors for 
allowing extended periods of job search (Word Bank, 1999). Therefore, it seems that in 
low income countries, members of poorer households cannot afford to stay unemployed for 
a prolonged period of time. They try to cushion the loss of earnings by opting for low 
productivity jobs (mostly in the informal sector) instead of not working at all while they 
continue to search for more adequate and better paid jobs.  
 
Implications for the UI program design  
The above considerations lead us to infer that when transferring UI program to developing 
countries, it would be advisable to change the standard, OECD-style design as follows:  
(i)  exempt informal sector work from disqualifying conditions for continuing 
eligibility,  
(ii)  drop conventional monitoring of continuing eligibility and, possibly, introduce 
work or training requirements, and  
(iii)  rely exclusively on  employers’ and workers’ contributions as a source of 
financing. 
 
Exempting informal sector work from disqualifying conditions for continuing eligibility.  
The enforcement of standard continuing eligibility conditions, if applied to developing 
countries, would hamper self-protection via taking informal jobs or working as 
underemployed, thus taking advantage of employment opportunities that, by and large, are 
not available in developed countries where unemployment is a “discrete” event.
5 In 
choosing between relying on unemployment benefits or taking a temporary, low-paid job, 
many such workers would prefer unemployment benefits, which means that insurance 
would reduce their incentives to work – and thus to self-protect.  The ensuing efficiency 
losses could be high, because activities forgone due to public income support may not be 
much less productive than those carried out in formal production units, due to the low 
capital intensity of the latter ones. Unless benefit eligibility monitoring produces larger 
post-unemployment wages or otherwise improves job matches – in the light of the 
evidence presented in the previous section, a highly unlikely scenario – the reduced self-
protection would hamper efficiency. 
 
Dropping conventional monitoring of continuing eligibility and introducing work 
requirements. If applied to developing countries, the standard, OECD-style monitoring of 
continuing eligibility would produce prohibitively large costs to be effective. In 
comparison to developed countries, eligibility monitoring is more demanding and thus 
costly because of a larger informal sector, which provides more abundant informal 
employment opportunities.  Above all, monitoring of availability for work, and earnings 
obtained from informal employment, becomes exceedingly challenging.  The existence of 
a large informal sector, together with the ease of entry into – and exit from – informal 
                                                 
5 Information problems plaguing the traditional UI system prevent a virtuous circle of self-protection leading 
to lower insurance premiums, an argument advanced by Gill and Ilahi (2000). 
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individuals, difficult if not impossible. Moreover, ample informal sector opportunities 
make monitoring of job search behavior similarly costly and intractable (the presence of 
informal sector opportunities also make more difficult to specify the “suitable job” as well 
as the conditions for active job search, including the proofs of such search (see below on 
information requirements to determine continuing benefit eligibility). Therefore, an 
alternative way of avoiding the misuse of the benefits financed on solidarity basis seems 
more attractive: imposing work or other requirements (such as participation in training) as 
a condition of benefit receipt. And introducing self-policing via relying on personal 
savings as the source of finance of benefits also greatly reduces the need for conventional 
monitoring of continuing benefit eligibility (see below).
6
 
Relying exclusively on employers’ and workers’ contributions as sources of financing. 
Another deviation from the existing UI practice is the desirability of the self-financing of 
the scheme. This follows from the fact that particularly under large underemployment, the 
occurrence of unemployment tends to be more concentrated among the non-poor 
population (see above). To prevent regressive redistribution, the financing of the scheme 
should therefore rely exclusively on contributions from workers and employers covered 
under the scheme, and not on public funding.   
Adapting UI to weak administrative capacity  
Performance of social programs also depends on administrative capacity to deliver the 
program – and this applies with full force to the UI program. We argue that developing 
countries, particularly low-income ones, typically have weak administrative capacity to 
administer this program, and that under such administration, the standard, OECD-style UI 
program would produce several undesirable outcomes: long durations of benefit receipt, 
double dipping (UI recipients working in the informal sector and receiving earnings on top 
of UI benefits), and high prevalence of bribes. To improve the program, we propose 
strengthening of financial incentives and keeping benefits modest, and avoiding judgments 
when awarding benefits. 
 
Why is the administrative capacity of developing countries insufficient for a standard UI 
program? Such a program requires obtaining continual, extensive and sophisticated 
information that is rarely available in developing countries, particularly low-income ones. 
First, the monitoring capacity of UI eligibility is weak because these countries typically 
lack administrative social security databases on individual workers that would allow cost-
effective methods of cross-checking the benefit receipt with earnings or the receipt of other 
benefits. Second, the standard UI program relies on personalized monitoring of continuing 
eligibility that requires making decisions based on judgments of government officials, and 
the capacity of many countries to arrive at unbiased decisions (and avoid bribes) is rather 
                                                 
6 Among the available mechanisms to reduce work disincentives in UI benefit programs, we are thus 
suggesting to rely primarily on financial incentives and work requirements coupled by benefit sanctions, as 
opposed to monitoring (for the evaluation of these methods, see Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2006a and 
2006b). 
  13weak. And third, there exists a high political risk – risk that resources are mismanaged or 
used for other purposes.  
 
Before elaborating on implications for UI design, we describe first the informational 
requirements of the standard UI program, the description crucial to understand why the 
capacity of developing countries would typically not suffice to provide it. 
 
Informational requirements of a standard UI program. Below we focus on the capacity to 
evaluate initial and continuing program eligibility, as well as to pay out benefits as 
required under the standard, OECD-style UI program. Specifically, we discuss the capacity 
to generate and process information on the payment of program contributions by or on 
behalf of the workers, as well as on their employment/unemployment status, job search 
effort, incomes from other sources, and assets. 
 
With recent advancements in information and communication technology, the record-
keeping of payments of insurance premiums as well as disbursements of funds has become 
increasingly affordable even in low-income countries. An example of such a program 
which exists even in low-income countries are pension programs, which typically require a 
long history of contributions for individual workers. Precisely this kind of information 
program is necessary for the administration of unemployment insurance.    
 
While information technology is instrumental in maintaining records on premium 
payments, it is only of limited help when it comes to checking other eligibility 
requirements under UI program, particularly the continuing eligibility.  The need for 
additional screening of applicants arises from the fact that UI program is prone to the 
moral hazard problem: the status of unemployment triggers the payment of benefits – 
hence disincentives to take a job.  Besides checking whether recipients are in fact working, 
one also has to monitor whether they are available and willing to take a job, and whether 
they are actively searching for a job.  
 
Several factors make monitoring of continuing eligibility conditions under a standard UI 
program a challenging task even for developed and transition countries.  First, what is the 
best way to monitor “availability for work” – the requirement often used to curtail informal 
employment? Different countries use different approaches, but they all have shortcomings. 
For example, amendments in the unemployment benefit law of Slovenia in the late 1990s 
required that benefit recipients make themselves available for contacts by employment 
offices for three hours per day, but results showed little effect on disqualification 
(Vodopivec, 2004). Moreover, such an arrangement may well backfire because it forces 
employment counselors to assume two opposing roles: one of job facilitator, and the other 
of a policeman. On the one hand, counselors try to help the unemployed by preparing a job 
plan, directing them to training, etc.; on the other hand, they are forced to “spy” on the 
unemployed to find out whether they are in fact available to take a job – and, if deemed 
necessary, disqualify them from receiving benefits.  Second, similar difficulties exist with 
respect to the monitoring of the requirement of “actively seeking employment.” Because 
this requirement entails many different aspects, it cannot be easily incorporated in 
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depend on individual circumstances (such as skills, qualifications, experience, and also the 
length of the unemployment spell), as well as on available vacancies in the local labor 
market. Third, additional problems are involved in determining a “suitable job,” and the 
amount of work that may be undertaken without being disqualified from benefit receipt.  It 
is thus not surprising that disqualification from unemployment benefits occurs rarely, and 
that this practice differs across countries as well as within a country.
7
 
The task of monitoring continuing eligibility is somewhat easier in countries with 
interlinked administrative bases of individuals. For example, in the Poznan region 
(Poland), a pilot information management project reduced benefit leakage by checking 
whether unemployment benefit recipients had already taken a job. The screening has been 
based on advanced communications capabilities among employment offices, on one side, 
and Social Security Administration and Tax Office, on the other (Vodopivec, 2004). In 
developing countries, however, such interlinked programs may not exist, and other 
information technology of local government and public employment service offices is 
limited.  Faced with the above described monitoring problems, the Argentinean UI 
program altogether avoids checking the continuing eligibility of their UI recipients, but has 
developed the capacity to cross-check whether benefit recipients are also on social security 
payment rolls (Mazza 1999). 
 
Implications for the UI program design 
The above discussion has the following implications about how to adjust the standard, 
OECD-style UI program to developing countries: 
(i)  strengthen financial incentives to address motivational problems by relying on 
unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISAs) and keeping benefits 
modest, and 
(ii)  avoid relying on the judgment when awarding benefits. 
 
Strengthening financial incentives and keeping benefits modest. The lack of appropriate 
administrative capacity to effectively monitor continuing eligibility and to impose 
sanctions implies that the moral hazard problem which arises from asymmetric information 
could be particularly prominent. As a consequence, benefit recipients would draw benefits 
longer (many for the maximum potential duration – see Vodopivec and Hang Tong, 2008, 
                                                 
7 Micklewright and Nagy (1998) report that in Hungary disqualification from unemployment insurance 
benefits receipt rarely occurs.  For example, of the March 1992 cohort of benefit recipients, 4 percent of 
spells ended that way.  The risk of disqualification was much higher for the young, the less-educated, blue-
collar workers, and those living in the capital, Budapest.  While conceivably such differences could occur 
with the same degree of enforcement of the rules, in all likelihood the severity with which the sanctions are 
imposed vary across offices within the country – as well as between countries.  For example, the risk of 
benefit disqualification in Slovenia is much lower than in Hungary – in 1998, only one percent of spells 
ended with disqualification, and in 1999, only 0.65 percent, despite changes in legislation aimed at improving 
the monitoring of benefit eligibility.  And in Estonia, the country with extremely modest unemployment 
benefits, casual evidence suggest that employment offices sometimes side with the unemployed and do not 
take any actions that would result in disqualification – precisely because the benefit is so low (see OECD, 
2000, for evidence on OECD countries). 
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sector. Keeping the level of benefits low and their potential benefit duration short alleviates 
such problems, but, of course, does not remove them.  A complementary, and arguably a 
more powerful, method is to reinforce financial incentives for (re)employment via 
unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISAs) – the approach that would, at the same 
time, minimize bad governance and political risk. 
 
UISAs are among the most radical and promising new approaches to reduce employment 
disincentives in unemployment benefit programs.  Under the UISA system, each worker is 
required to save a fraction of earnings in his or her account, and draw unemployment 
benefits from it. By internalizing the costs of unemployment benefits, the UISA system is 
expected to change workers’ incentives and thus avoid or at least reduce the moral hazard 
inherent in traditional UI schemes (Orszag and Snower 1997, Orszag et al 1999) – while, 
under some proposals, providing the same protection to the unemployed as the traditional 
UI system.
8 In contrast to pure UISAs, where withdrawals are strictly limited by the 
account balance (that is, the balance on an individual’s UISA must always be 
nonnegative), other types of UISAs allow for solidarity funding: under UISA-cum-
borrowing individuals can borrow, within predetermined limits, from their UISAs; and 
under the UISA-cum-solidarity-fund, individuals can receive payments from the solidarity 
fund after depleting their own accounts (see the description of the Chilean example below). 
Because the UISAs are still largely an uncharted territory, empirical evidence is mostly 
provided via simulations studies that are, by and large, encouraging.
9
 
A very recent study of van Ours, Reyes and Vodopivec, (2009), however, is the first one to 
provide empirical evidence corroborating theoretical predictions that UISAs improve work 
incentives and can thus be used as an effective tool to combat the moral hazard problem of 
traditional UI systems. Using a mixed proportional hazard rate model, van Ours et al 
(2009) examine the determinants of job-finding rate of unemployment benefit recipients 
under the Chilean program and find that: (i) the larger the resources on the UISA at the 
start of the unemployment spell (and thus the lower the potential benefits from the 
solidarity fund), the higher the probability of exit from unemployment of benefit 
recipients; (ii) for benefit recipient not using solidarity fund, the amount of accumulation 
on the UISA does not affect hazard rate from unemployment, suggesting that such 
individuals internalize the costs of unemployment benefits, and (iii) for beneficiaries using 
solidarity fund, the unemployment duration dependence pattern is consistent with moral 
                                                 
8 Another way of looking at the improved incentives is noting that the UISA system is based on lifetime 
income, not current income, which is much more volatile. By doing so, it enables workers to self-finance 
shorter unemployment spells and public funds to be targeted to those facing larger shocks. The system thus 
eliminates the “piggy-bank” function of unemployment insurance (redistribution across the life cycle). This 
redistribution represents the majority of spending in welfare states (Barr 2001 reports that two-thirds to three-
quarters of welfare-state spending is life-cycle redistribution). Eliminating this function reduces taxes and 
thus disincentives. 
9 For example, Feldstein and Altman (1998) simulated the working of the UISA system for the U.S. and 
conclude that it is a viable alternative to the standard UI system (similar conclusion is reached by Folster, 
1999 and 2001, for Sweden, and Vodopivec, 2008, for Slovenia). 
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effects. 
 
The  UISAs-cum-borrowing variant that uses pension wealth as the collateral deserves 
particular attention. Under this scheme, upon being laid off, workers enrolled in social 
security would be entitled to borrow, under certain conditions and up to a predetermined 
threshold (depending on the individual pension wealth), from their UISA, thereby 
enhancing consumption smoothing properties of the scheme as compared to pure UISAs 
(that do not allow any borrowing). Their accumulated pension wealth would act as 
collateral and perhaps also as a source of funding. Workers would be required to repay the 
debt (and accrued interest) upon their reemployment by a slight increase of their 
contribution rate; any outstanding debt upon retirement would be subtracted from their 
pension wealth.  If the pension system uses defined benefit formulas, the debt repayment 
would imply in effect a temporary reduction of the pension benefit (see details in 
Vodopivec, Robalino and Bodor, 2009, for details and discussion of implementation 
issues). Note that two most innovative elements of this proposal – allowing the 
unemployed to borrow from their UISAs and using pension wealth as an ultimate 




Two important features of the above design must be particularly emphasized. First, the 
design addresses, in a most direct and thorough way, the problem of work disincentives 
(moral hazard) created by standard UI programs. By drawing benefits from their own 
UISAs, individuals do not have an incentive to prolong their job search or to postpone 
taking a job, and the requirement that at the end of the working career, the negative balance 
on their UISAs is subtracted from their pension wealth makes the system completely proof 
to moral hazard and strategic behavior. Second, such a scheme could be adopted by 
countries that currently do not have an unemployment benefits system to provide 
unemployment compensation for workers affected by global economic crisis – such as the 
one emerging currently. Namely, relying on past social security contributions as a 
qualifying condition and piggybacking on existing administrative capacity of the social 
security system to deliver unemployment benefits allows the scheme to become 
operational in a short time, for example, in 4-6 months.  
 
Avoiding judgments in awarding benefits.  As explained above, the OECD style UI 
program requires officials to confirm continuing benefit eligibility based on their 
judgments (whether recipients are available and willing to take a job, and whether they are 
actively searching for a job). In many developing countries, however, the capacity to carry 
out such regulations even in the absence of information problems – the capacity connected 
by the quality of governance and prevalence of corruption – is worse than in developed 
countries, and the program thus much more prone to misuses.  Under such circumstances, 
the program design that avoids judgments made by program administrators is preferred. 
 
                                                 
10 Such a scheme, however, is under consideration by Jordan. 
  173.  Experience with the UI Program in Developing and Transition Countries 
 
Given the above theoretical discussion about the importance of country-specific 
circumstances for the operation of UI programs, it is worthwhile to review the actual 
experience with UI programs by transition and developing countries, in particular, to 
examine how these countries have proceeded about the introduction and design of their UI 
programs. As explained below, in transition countries some efficiency measures show that 
the performance of UI programs has been comparable to the one in developed countries 
and that, somewhat surprisingly, the performance of the program in poverty reduction and 
distributive properties was even better than the one of developed countries.  In developing 
countries, few UI programs exist, and very few of them have been studied in considerable 
detail. Interestingly, in Argentina, an upper-middle-income country, the capacity for 
screening the initial eligibility for UI is adequate ( the existing capacity of other social 
insurance programs has been used), but more than ten years after UI’s introduction the 
country has still not acquired effective capacity to monitor continuing eligibility. 
Moreover, in Venezuela the pertinent legislation was introduced in 1991, but the program 
has yet to be implemented.  
 
Transition countries. Vodopivec et al (2005) show that unemployment benefits in 
transition countries were progressive and that – in countries with broad coverage and 
sizeable share of benefits in household incomes – they also strongly reduced poverty. 
Because coverage was very wide-spread and because earnings represented the single most 
important household income, the unemployment compensation provided to job-losers 
prevented many of them to be pushed into poverty.  The evidence also shows that the 
income redistribution produced by unemployment benefits was strongly progressive, 
although it did not reach the extreme outcomes obtained, for example, in Chile, where 
about 60 percent of unemployment benefits is received by the poorest quintile of the 
population (Krumm et al, 1994). Because UI contribution rates are earnings related, the 
incidence of net benefits, that is, the incidence of benefits once both the cost and benefits 
are considered, is even more progressive.
11  
 
It must be emphasized that the poverty reduction performance of unemployment benefit 
programs in transition countries is unlikely to be matched by developing countries. In 
transition countries, UI programs have covered practically all workers from their very 
introduction. In contrast, in developing countries the coverage is much more limited, and 
the covered workers already have the advantage of working in the formal sector and thus 
usually belong to a relatively prosperous population group (see below on the coverage of 
workers in South Korea following its introduction UI in the mid-1990s).  
 
As for efficiency effects, empirical studies for transition economies – in line with the 
evidence on developed economies – show that unemployment benefits reduce the 
probability of leaving unemployment to take a job. Except for Romania, the negative 
                                                 
11 The impact of unemployment benefits is less progressive in developed countries.  As shown  by Forster 
(2000), the effects of benefits are progressive in about half of the OECD countries, and neutral in the other 
half.  
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employment have been confirmed for all countries for which such studies were performed, 
although some studies also found little evidence of work disincentives (see Vodopivec et 
al, 2005, for a summary of empirical findings).  Most studies find that the exit rate from 
unemployment to employment significantly increases near benefit exhaustion (in some 
countries, the exit rate to inactivity also increases). The effects of the replacement ratio are 
less pronounced:  Ham et al. (1998) find significant effects for the Czech Republic but not 
for Slovakia; Vodopivec (1995) also finds insignificant effects for Slovenia.  As for the 
scale of these effects, Ham et al (1998) find the effects for the Czech Republic to be 
comparable to the ones in developed economies (few other studies provide estimates of the 
elasticity of the duration of unemployment with respect to potential duration and level of 
benefits).   
 
Asia. Recent survey shows that UI programs are offered by China, Iran, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and since 2002, also by Kuwait and Turkey. With the exception of Korea, little is 
know about the working of these programs, so in continuation we focus on relatively well 
researched and often mentioned Korean case. Thanks to the introduction of unemployment 
insurance, the financial crisis of the late 1990s was less painful for many Korean 
unemployed – although those covered by the insurance, as well as those in the receipt of 
benefits, were in large minority.  
 
Oil shocks of the 1970s stimulated discussions about the need for an UI program in Korea. 
But it was only in 1995, after more than two years of intense discussions and hearings, that 
Korea eventually introduced a compulsory UI which – together with training and job 
information service – forms its “employment insurance program.”  At its introduction, UI 
was limited to workers in firms with at least 30 workers, covering about 21 percent of 
employed workers. Although the coverage was expanded during the financial crisis to 
cover workers in smaller firms, the coverage only modestly increased. In mid-1998 – at the 
height of the financial crisis – insurance was extended to firms with 5 or more employees 
and covered 24 percent, and by December 1999, to all firms, covering 57 percent of all 
wage workers (see details in Vodopivec, 2004). 
 
By a historic coincidence – having just introduced UI a couple of years before the crisis – 
Korea was able to provide unemployment benefits to the swollen ranks of the unemployed 
during the crisis of 1998. Still, at the height of the crisis, unemployment benefits were 
received only by 7.6 percent of workers, and by February 2003 this percentage doubled. 
Important limitations to further expansion of the coverage are set by (i) large informal 
sector, estimated to amount to more than a third of total employment; and (ii) a large 
segment of temporary and daily workers.  Workers of these two groups are ineligible for 
unemployment insurance, and they constitute about 80 percent of all unemployed (Vroman 
and Brusentsev, 2005).   
 
Latin America. UI programs exist in only few countries, with quite limited coverage. The 
program is offered by Argentina, Barbados, Chile, and Brazil.  Few analytical studies 
about the performance of these programs exist, so below we concentrate on the description 
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introduced (last amendments in 1991), but the program has yet to be implemented. 
Moreover, in Argentina, the capacity for screening the initial eligibility for UI is adequate 
(the existing capacity of other social protection programs has been used) but decades after 
UI’s introduction the country has still not acquired effective capacity to monitor continuing 
eligibility.  
 
Argentina’s administrative hurdles connected with the introduction of unemployment 
insurance are instructive. Argentina introduced its unemployment insurance program in 
1992, following a macroeconomic crisis that raised the fear of large-scale, open 
unemployment.
12  While the administration of benefits has seemingly proceeded smoothly 
(workers are informed of their eligibility and receive payments on a timely basis), the 
program only recently acquired the capacity to detect recipients who have found new jobs 
in the formal sector – and still applies few measures to prevent the leakage of benefits to 
those who have found jobs in the informal sector (Mazza 1999).  Through a newly 
introduced program of common personal identification numbers, the government has been 
able to cross-check whether unemployment insurance recipients are also on social security 
payment rolls. (Personal identification numbers were introduced in 1994, and it took 
several years to develop this cross-checking capability.)  This way, significant numbers of 
benefit recipients actually working in the formal sector are purged from the benefit receipt 
lists.  A far greater number of recipients are likely to be working in the informal sector, but 
currently no measures are being taken to detect them. 
 
Since it offers a very interesting example, below we provide a more detailed description of 
the Chilean program. In October 2002, Chile introduced a new, innovative UI program 
which combines social insurance with self-insurance. Unemployment contributions are 
split between individual accounts and a common, solidarity account, which is partly 
financed also by the government. Both workers and employers pay contributions. By doing 
so, employers reduce their severance payments obligations, so severance pay is being 
partly replaced by the new UI program. The new program is effectively a funded program, 
with individual accounts being managed by a freestanding administrator selected through a 
competitive tender. To stimulate reemployment, benefit recipients first draw resources 
from their own accounts, and upon depletion from the solidarity account. Withdrawals 
from individual accounts are triggered by separation from the employer, regardless of the 
reason. Withdrawals from the common fund are triggered by insufficient resources on 
individual accounts, if the claimant satisfies the usual conditions of continuing eligibility 
under UI (such as not working and being available and searching for job), but are limited 
to 2 withdrawals per 5 years. Benefits are linked to past earnings, with a declining 
schedule. 
                                                 
12 The total number of recipients has been relatively small – on average, about 100-125,000 workers receive 
benefits, out of 2 million officially unemployed workers.  Administration of the program (processing of 
claims and payment of benefits) was handed over to the social security system (ANSES – Administración 
Nacional de la Seguridad Nacional), which operates a national network of offices and which reports to the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security.  Workers go to one of 150 local ANSES offices to register and receive 
their checks; there are no job placement or other reemployment services provided Mazza, 1999).   
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The Chilean example offers several advantages. It enables widespread risk pooling and 
offers other advantages the public provision of UI (for example, in comparison to private 
insurers it public agencies can better monitor benefit eligibility) – while, at the same time, 
addresses the moral hazard problem inherent in UI by introducing “self-policing.” This 
version can therefore improve: (i) incentives in comparison to the traditional UI program, 
particularly in countries with  ineffective monitoring programs, and (ii) income protection 
in comparison to pure forced savings mechanism (such as in pre-funded severance pay 




To summarize, the experience of transition countries with unemployment benefit programs 
has been quite positive, but it has to be remembered that in comparison to developing 
countries, they have relied on relatively better administrative capacity and a more limited 
informal sector. Moreover, some of these countries would probably benefit from tailoring 
the program according to their circumstances (for example, particularly for low-income 
countries, introducing a flat-rate benefit instead of earnings-related one could be a better 
option, as it would reduce costs and simplify the administration). That the influence of 
these programs in developing countries has remained quite modest is suggested by the 
limited coverage of unemployment benefit programs in Asian and Latin American 
countries. Moreover, some countries have formally introduced such programs, but they 
have failed to implement them (Venezuela and Egypt). 
 
4.  Case Study: Facilitating Sri Lanka’s Severance Pay Reform by Introducing UI? 
 
If a country is faced with overly restrictive employment protection legislation, introducing 
UI may be the way to proceed – and it may be worthwhile even though other 
considerations would suggest that such an introduction is premature. Sri Lanka is facing 
just such a dilemma: the country’s severance pay program – embodied in the Termination 
of Employment of Workman Act (TEWA) of 1971 – is one of the costliest and most 
restrictive severance pay programs in the world. The TEWA requires employers with more 
than 14 workers to seek the authorization of the Commissioner of Labor for intended 
layoffs. It not only requires that employers pay high compensation to laid off workers, but 
its discretionary nature and lengthy procedures further restrict the ability of employers to 
lay off workers (see Abidoye et al, 2009).  The likely consequences of high separation costs 
are discussed above;  in the Sri Lankan context, World Bank (2007) attributes low job 
creation and destruction flows in Sri Lanka to TEWA, and Abidoye et al show that the 
TEWA program is constraining firms’ growth. 
 
A self-standing, radical reform of the Sri Lankan severance pay program would thus be 
beneficial from both efficiency and equity standpoint – but for political economy reasons, 
it is clear that relaxing job protection legislation can only go hand in hand with 
                                                 
13 Simulations of Hopenhayn and Hatchondo (2002) show that when its parameters are appropriately 
selected, a system which combines self- and social insurance indeed comes very close to the welfare 
properties of the optimal unemployment insurance system. 
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sense, provided, of course, that the reform indeed leads to substantially more flexible 
employment protection legislation, including severance pay, and that the design of the 
unemployment program is adapted to Sri Lanka’s realities, minimizing the creation of 
disincentives and ensuring affordability.   
 
In this section we try to formulate the design features of the unemployment benefit 
program suitable to Sri Lankan circumstances. Above we argued that effective and smooth 
operation of the UI program depends on the several country-specific factors, and that these 
factors have to be carefully evaluated and accounted for in the design of the program. We 
also derived some specific recommendations about the program design. Using the above 
framework, we examine how to adapt unemployment benefit by reviewing the most 
important country-specific features relevant to the working of the UI program in Sri Lanka, 
and, based on this review, propose both short-term and long-term building blocks of a UI 
program adapted to Sri Lankan circumstances.  
 
We argue that the introduction of the UB program in Sri Lanka calls for a gradual approach 
and the need for creative adaptation of the standard UI program. Consistent with guidance 
derived in Section 2, we argue for incorporating strong financial incentives to counter work 
disincentives, the elimination of personalized monitoring of beneficiaries, simplified 
administration, the use of existing financial networks, and exclusive financing by 
employers’ and workers’ contributions.  
Reviewing Sri Lankan circumstances  
 
Below we review the most important specific circumstances prevailing in Sri Lanka that 
would affect the performance of an UI program. 
 
Low stage of development of the labor market. The Sri Lankan labor market is still at a 
relatively low level of development: 
•  Unemployment is not a “discrete event:” a large proportion of the workforce is 
underemployed, and World Bank (2007) estimates that two thirds of workers are 
engaged in the informal sector; and entry to informal employment, and exit from it, 
is easy.  
•  Unemployment is more prevalent among richer segments (and thus it can be 
expected that the majority of claimants will come from better-off segments of 
population) – see World Bank (2007). 
 
Weak administrative capacity.  At present, no employment offices as known in developed 
countries exist in Sri Lanka. Since 2003, however, the government – in partnership with 
the private sector – is building such a network (JobsNet), and regional JobsNet centers 
have been put in place in all 9 provinces. These centers are meant to provide counseling, 
information about vacancies in the local and foreign market (interactive databases), 
linkages to training providers, and information about benefits available to the unemployed.  
The JobsNet network seems to be quickly gaining the capacity to provide quality job-
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effective administration of a standard UI program is based that the current network is ill-
prepared to carry out. 
 
Susceptibility to political risk. In Sri Lanka there are concerns about the availability of the 
accumulated Employees Provident Fund (EPF) funds for retirement benefits, because of 
the ability of the government to utilize EPF funds to finance budgetary expenditures 
(World Bank, 2007). 
 
The above review, coupled by the discussion about the transferability of the UI program in 
Section 2, allows us to provide the following assessment of the likely performance of a 
standard UI program if applied to Sri Lanka: 
•  Monitoring of continuing benefit eligibility conditions (that is, monitoring whether the 
beneficiaries are actively seeking for a job and whether they are available for and 
capable to work) would be ineffective. Ineffectiveness would produce large 
employment disincentives (moral hazard) and/or misuses (double-dipping), so that 
many recipients would collect their benefits until the end of their potential benefit 
duration (and, possibly, work in the informal sector at the same time). 
•  The program would stimulate corruption: because of the personal nature of the 
monitoring of continuing benefit eligibility conditions, and because of the vague 
definition of conditions and the lack of precise procedures to verify them, recipients 
would have to share the “rent” arising from the continuation of benefit eligibility with 
employment office councilors.  
•  If substantial reserves of the UB program are accumulated, they might be used for 
other purposes. 
•  There would be large start-up costs and also large processing costs of benefit claims. 
Because the design of such a program calls for specific monitoring functions, the 
program administration would be costly, as its ability to piggy-back on other 
administrative systems (social security, in particular) would be limited.  
•  There would be problems with the enforcement of the payment of contributions to the 
UB fund, particularly in industries with low layoff probability. 
Building blocks of a unemployment benefit program adapted to Sri Lanka 
 
How can Sri Lanka adapt the standard UI program so as to avoid or mitigate the above-
identified problems?  Based on the argumentation in Section 2, several important features 
of UI program – some sharply deviating from the standard, OECD-style program – can be 
recommended:  
(i)  rely on individual unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISAs) to 
provide unemployment benefits, thereby introducing strong financial incentives 
to prevent work disincentives (in the longer term, UISAs can be complemented 
by solidarity funding),   
(ii)  eliminate the conditions for continuing benefit eligibility which require a 
subjective assessment of recipients’ behavior and status, retaining working in 
the formal sector as the only disqualifying continuing eligibility condition;  
  23(iii)  use existent Employees Provident Fund (EPF) network for paying out 
unemployment benefits, thus piggybacking on its existing channels and 
administrative capacity to administer benefit claims;  
(iv)  avoid the use of other sources of financing but employers’ and workers’ 
contributions; and  
(v)  complement the financial side of the scheme by employment support services 
provided by the newly established “JobsNet” network. 
In the long run, the above framework could easily be adjusted to strengthen the social 
insurance component of the program while keeping strong (re)employment incentives.  
 
The substantiation and further elaboration of these features follows, distinguishing between 
the short- and long-term. In discussing short-term features, particular attention is paid to 
the delivery mechanism, that is, an attempt is made to provide operationally simple and 
relevant solutions.  
 
Desirable features of the unemployment benefit scheme in the short run 
 
The nature of the scheme and financial arrangements. Unemployment benefit scheme 
would be based on UISAs that would be maintained and administered by the EPF (the 
mandatory retirement savings fund). The unemployment benefit scheme would allow 
workers to finance benefits by drawing on savings generated while working (and financed 
by contributions by both employers and workers). To enhance consumption smoothing 
properties of the scheme, workers would have a possibility to borrow from these accounts 
within predetermined limits (say three monthly wages) – and, possibly, with subsidized 
interest rate for accounts with the negative balance. Upon the end of their working career, 
positive balances on unemployment benefit accounts would be paid out to workers and 
negative balances would be subtracted from their individual accumulations on their EPF 
accounts. The scheme would thus provide income protection without worsening 
employment incentives. 
 
Eligibility.  Both starting and continuing eligibility conditions would deviate significantly 
from the standard, OECD-style UI models. Starting eligibility conditions for 
unemployment benefits would be essentially the same as under the severance pay program 
(TEWA).  That is, all workers whose employment is terminated by the order of the Labor 
Commissioner and thus become eligible for a lump-sum payment under the amended 
TEWA, would, in addition, become eligible to unemployment benefits (eligibility for 
workers whose employers go bankrupt as – and who currently do not qualify for TEWA 
payments – would also have to be worked out). 
 
Another, even sharper deviation from OECD blueprints is suggested for continuing 
eligibility conditions. Because it relies on the subjective assessment of recipients’ behavior 
and status, we suggest to eliminate monitoring whether the beneficiaries are actively 
seeking a job, and whether they are available for and capable to work. As discussed above, 
such a waiver would not only save on administrative costs, but it also is attuned to the 
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self-protection behavior.   
 
The only condition for continuing eligibility that seems sensible to keep is non-
employment in the formal sector. That is, in case that the beneficiaries start working in the 
formal sector, they would become ineligible for unemployment benefits.  This condition 
could easily be implemented even from the very start, given the possibility that the 
existing, Employment Provident Fund (EPF) network, is used to administer and disburse 
unemployment benefits (EPF’s current information program allows for that).  
 
The level of benefits. Affordability and employment incentives dictate a modest level of 
benefits, for example, a maximum potential duration of 6 month and a replacement rate of 
50 percent. In principle, the self-policing nature of benefits (see above under financing) 
should take care of work disincentives, but because of myopia, keeping benefits modest 
would still be a good idea. 
 
Administration of scheme.  To minimize administrative costs and to enable smooth 
implementation, it is advisable for the unemployment benefit scheme to use the existing 
social security network for its benefit administration. Such an arrangement would 
eliminate the need to create another expensive bureaucracy, only to duplicate existing 
capacities. Indeed, by choosing eligibility criteria which are administratively simple and, in 
given circumstances, desirable on their own right, the administration of the unemployment 
benefit scheme could simply piggyback on existing EPF channels – and its existing 
capacity – to effect the unemployment benefit payments.
14  
 
Coverage. The scheme would cover the same employers and workers paying contributions 
to the EPF.  
Employment services for the UB recipients. In the initial phase of the implementation of 
the scheme and until their adequate scope in a country like Sri Lanka can be better 
assessed, such services could be kept at a modest level, for example, requiring that benefit 
recipients register as jobseekers with the JobsNet and maintain such a status during the 
period of benefit receipt.  
 
Desirable features of a UB scheme in the long run 
 
Above we described desirable features of the UB scheme attuned to the current 
circumstances.  In a longer run, a country will be able to modify and improve the scheme 
based on the experience of the first, developmental phase the scheme, as well as taking 
                                                 
14 For example, if left on its own, the UB scheme would have to acquire the capacity to check whether 
employers’ contributions for prospective beneficiaries have been paid – the capacity already residing by the 
EPF.  Moreover, the UB scheme would also have to set up a new network to determine starting and 
continuing eligibility, to keep the balance of benefits to be paid, and effect the payments when they become 
due.  Under the arrangements proposed below, some of these functions are simplified and in such a case, 
existing capacity of EPF would suffice to implement the system.   
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Below we provide some features which may be considered in such a scheme.  
 
One appealing option for longer-term reforms is replacing current, conditional severance 
payments as required under the TEWA to unconditional, regular payments to all workers 
that are deposited directly to their individual accounts, thus strengthening the system 
introduced in the short run (such a reform would introduce room for higher contribution 
rates and hence for more generous unemployment benefits). This would bring a complete 
and full transformation of employers’ obligations under TEWA into their regular monthly 
contributions the individual account of workers (note that gratuity pay program would still 
provide severance pay comparable to such schemes in developed countries). Employers 
would gain by getting rid of the non-transparent, discretionary costs incurred by TEWA; 
workers would gain by receiving payments to their UISAs (Austria introduced such a 
reform in 2002 – see Koman et al, 2005).
15  
 
One possible modification of the scheme introduced in the short run is to add an explicit 
solidarity component to supplement life-time individual savings as the basis of insurance. 
To minimize work disincentives, the payment of unemployment benefits at the beginning 
of unemployment spell would still be drawn from UISAs, but upon its depletion 
(alternatively, upon reaching the limit of borrowing from this account) and if fulfilling 
continuing eligibility criteria, benefits could be drawn from the solidarity fund (a version 
of such a program was introduced in 2002 in Chile – see above). 
 
Other important dilemmas about the long-term features of the UB scheme would also have 
to be carefully examined. For example, the effectiveness and efficiency of employment 
services, such as job-search assistance, job development, and training, for benefit 
recipients would have to be carefully assessed, and on that basis the employment support 
services to beneficiaries redesigned, if necessary. Moreover, the feasibility and options for 
introducing monitoring of job search behavior and labor market status of UB recipients 
could be explored, so as to check whether the standard conditions for continuing benefit 
eligibility can be fruitfully introduced. In that case, the options of declining level of 
benefits over individual unemployment spell could be considered, so as to minimize work 
disincentives.  
 
5.  Concluding Remarks  
 
The performance of UI depends not only on the design of the program, but also critically 
on country-specific factors. A successful and smooth performance of the standard, OECD-
type of UI program is based on a developed labor market and it relies on a strong 
administrative capacity, an informal sector of modest size, a low incidence of 
underemployment, and low political risk – conditions that are typically lacking in 
                                                 
15 Parsons (2003) explores the conditions under which mandated unemployment insurance savings accounts 
are superior to mandated severance pay as a mechanism for smoothing the consumption of workers 
permanently separated from their jobs. 
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developing countries.  
 
The main implications for the design of the program, arranged by the features from which 
they are derived, are as follows:   
•  Because of their weak administrative capacity, developing countries should (i) 
consider strengthening financial incentives by basing unemployment benefits on 
unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISAs) and by keeping benefits 
modest, avoid relying on the judgment when awarding benefits, and (ii) avoid 
personalized monitoring of benefit eligibility that is likely to be ineffective and/or 
prone to corruption, at least in the initial phase.  
•  Because of a low stage of development of the labor market, the OECD-style 
monitoring of availability for work and job search is likely to be prohibitively 
expensive. This again speaks in favor of a simplified monitoring of continuing 
eligibility requirements. 
  
•  Because UB recipients tend to come from better-off segments of population, the 
program should avoid using any other sources of financing but employers’ and 
workers’ contributions. 
•  Because  of the high political risk and environment prone to corruption, the 
program would benefit from a transparent and simple payment mechanism in the 
form, for example, of individual accounts.  
•  The above factors combined speak in favor of modest benefits in terms of both the 
replacement rate as well as potential duration of benefits. 
 
Although some warn against its premature introduction, the options proposed in this paper 
offer an attractive approach for developing countries wishing to introduce unemployment 
benefits. Assessing the desirability and prospects of the introduction of UI program to 
developing countries, Yoo (2001), for example, argues against its immediate introduction 
to a country like the Philippines, but maintains that the program should be seriously 
considered in the medium term, once some preconditions are fulfilled.
16  Similar is the 
assessment of Gill and Ilahi (2000) for Latin American countries that note the lack of 
capacity to run an efficient UI program. This paper explicitly addresses the circumstances 
that render the UI program difficult to transfer to developing countries, and offers creative 
solutions about how to address the problem of work disincentives and “double-dipping” 
via the work in informal sector, two most important problems. Particularly attractive is the 
innovative proposal of the UISAs-cum-borrowing that uses pension wealth as the collateral 
that makes the system completely proof to moral hazard and strategic behavior. 
 
Let us conclude with emphasizing another motivation for the above proposed design of 
unemployment benefits: such a scheme could be deployed rapidly, for example, in 
response to global economic crises such as the one we are witnessing at the beginning of 
                                                 
16 Yoo (2001) cites a number of pre-conditions for introduction of the UI, including a national dialogue 
among the social partners to determine the best unemployment benefits system for the future, and capacity 
building in terms of both employment and training systems as well as record-keeping and fee-collection 
within the social security administration. 
  272009. By relying on past social security contributions as a qualifying condition and by 
piggybacking on existing administrative capacity of the social security system to deliver 
unemployment benefits, such a scheme could become operational in 4-6 months and could 
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Source of financing 
OECD countries 
Offered by most countries. 
Majority of programs 
cover all employed 
individuals irrespective of 
sector. In Austria, 
Germany, and 
Luxembourg, coverage 
extends to apprentices and 
training graduates. Many 
programs exclude the self-
employed, either 
generally, by occupation 
groups, or based on other 
conditions. Austria and 
Canada exclude public 
sector employees 
(voluntary provisions exist 
for provincial government 
employees). Ireland, 
Japan, Portugal, Spain, 
and the United States 
exclude domestic or 
casual workers. 
Initial replacement rates are usually 
40–75 percent of recent average 
earnings. Notable exception is 
Denmark, with 90 percent replacement 
rate. However, ceilings on wages and 
maximum benefit provisions limit 
range. Ireland, France, and the United 
Kingdom provide flat-rate benefits. 
Waiting period is  3–7 days. In some 
countries, in cases of voluntary 
quitting or dismissal due to 
misconduct, waiting period is extended 
by 6 weeks–6 months. Belgium, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom 
provide additional flat-rate benefits or 
additional percentages of average 
earnings for workers with spouses or 
children. Most countries, including 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States, tax benefits. In 
some countries, long-term 
unemployment insurance recipients 
transit into unemployment assistance. 
Most countries limit 
length of unemployment 
insurance entitlement. 
Maximum entitlement 
period is usually 3–12 
months, but in some 
European countries it is 
much longer (60 months in 
France, 48 months in 
Denmark, 36 months in 
Norway, and 32 months in 
Germany); in Belgium 
benefit duration is 
unlimited. Benefit 
duration is sometimes 
related to factors such as 
duration of  social security 
contribution payments 
within a certain period, 
employment, and age. 
To qualify, a person must in 
general be employed at least 6 
months in past year. Range: 10 
weeks in last 52 weeks in 
Iceland to 540 days in last 24 
months in Portugal. All 
countries require registration at 
employment office. France and 
Iceland have residency 
requirements. Almost all 
countries deny benefits in cases 
of voluntary quitting, 
misconduct, work stoppage, or 
refusal of a suitable job offer.  
Programs typically require 
recipient to be able, 
available, and willing to 
work, as well as searching 
for work. Recipients are 
disqualified if they fail to 
undergo training, 
unjustifiably refuse of 
suitable job offer, or fail to 
comply with job search 
requirements. Severity of 
offense determines period 
of disqualification (usually 
1–4 months). Regularly 
reporting to employment 
office is typically required.  
Most programs financed by 
contributions from employers 
and workers, with equal or 
higher contribution rates levied 
on employers. In only a few 
countries do solely employers 
or solely workers contribute 
(solely employers contribute in 
Iceland, Italy, and the United 
States; solely workers 
contribute in Luxembourg). 
Typically, the state covers any 
deficits that arise. In Italy and 
Spain, the state provides 
subsidies. In Italy, Japan, and 
the United States, the state 
covers administrative costs. 
Contribution rates vary 
significantly across countries. 
In most, contribution rates are 
less than 3 percent (but some 
require contributions of as 
much as 8 percent).  
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Eastern Europe and Central Asia (transition economies)  
Majority of programs cover 
employed workers  
(citizenship or residency 
required). Coverage by age: 
usually 16–59 for men and 16–
54 for women. In Croatia 
university or training graduates 
are also eligible. Domestic and 
casual workers are usually 
excluded. 
Initial income replacement rates are 
usually 50–75 percent of recent 
average wages. Benefits are limited 
by floors (usually the minimum 
wage) and ceilings (usually the 
local, regional, or national average 
wage). Benefit level sometimes 
depends on cause of job loss.  
 
Some countries (Albania, Poland) 
provide flat-rate benefits (usually in 
proportion to minimum or average 
wage) instead of or in addition to 
earnings-related benefits. Earnings-
related or flat-rate benefits can be 
graduated over time. Sometimes 
first-time job seekers receive flat-
rate benefits that are lower than 
minimum wage. Albania, 
Azerbaijan, the Kyrgyz Republic, 
the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and 





duration is 6–24 months. In 
some countries (Azerbaijan, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, 
the Russian Federation, the 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia), 
entitlement duration varies 
depending on length of 
employment, contribution 
period, and/or age. 
University and training 
graduates have shorter 
entitlement periods. Some 
countries provide extensions 
for people near retirement 
age. 
Minimum past employment 
requirement ranges from 3 to 
12 months. Registration at 
employment offices required 
by all countries. In Latvia, 
Romania, and Ukraine income 
level must be below minimum 
wage. In most countries 
workers are ineligible if they 
are dismissed because of 
misconduct.  
Programs typically require 
the recipient to be able, 
available, and willing to 
work, as well as searching 
for work. Recipients are 
disqualified if they refuse 
to undergo training. 
Benefits are reduced, 
postponed, or terminated if 
the recipient refuses a 
suitable job offer or does 
not comply with labor 
market requirements (job 
search, participation in 
public works or training) or 
files a fraudulent claim. 
 
Almost all countries require 
employer contributions; some 
also require worker 
contributions. Worker 
contribution rates range from 
0.06 percent (Slovenia) to 1 
percent (the Slovak Republic). 
Employer contributions range 
from 0.06 percent (Slovenia) to 
6 percent (Albania). State 
subsidies (when needed) or 
deficit financing is common.  
In Latvia the state finances 
unemployment insurance for 
special groups. In the Slovak 
Republic the state finances 
special programs.  
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Latin America and the Caribbean 
Argentina, Barbados, and 
Brazil provide unemployment 
insurance. Unemployment 
insurance legislation was 
introduced in Venezuela (last 
amendments in 1991), but the 
program has yet to be 
implemented. Argentina and 
Brazil cover all wage workers. 
Venezuela excludes domestics 
and casual workers. Barbados 
excludes public sector 
employees and the self-
employed. 
Income replacement rates are 50 and 
60–percent of recent average wages. 
In Argentina and Brazil, minimum 
and maximum benefit limits are 
proportional to the minimum wage. 
Waiting period is 3 days in 
Barbados, 60 days in Brazil, and 30 
days in Venezuela.  
Maximum entitlement period 
is 3–12 months. In Argentina 
and Brazil, the length of 
entitlement depends on the 
length of employment. In 
Brazil entitlement durations 
are increased under special 
circumstances. 
 
Generally, recipients must have 
been employed for 6–12 
months in some stipulated 
period of recent employment. 
In Brazil applicants are 
ineligible if dismissal due to 
misconduct, and claimants 
must lack other means to 
support self or household. In 
Argentina  applicants cannot 
receive other social security 
benefits.  
In Argentina and 
Venezuela, recipients must 
be able, available, and 
willing to work. In 
Argentina, continuing 
eligibility is not 
conditioned by job search 
requirement.] 
Contribution rates range from 
0.75 percent to 2 percent, with 
both employers and employees 
usually contributing. In Brazil 
the program is financed by 
employers, mainly through a 
business sales tax of 0.65 
percent. 
Asia 
China, Iran, Kuwait the 
Republic of Korea, Taiwan 
(China), and Turkey provide 
unemployment insurance.  
Coverage differs significantly. 
Iran excludes the self-
employed, voluntarily insured 
people, and people covered by 
other provisions. China 
excludes permanent and 
contract workers in public 
sector enterprises and some 
collective enterprises. The 
Republic of Korea includes all 
firms. Taiwan (China) 
excludes the self-employed 
and firms with fewer than five 
workers. 
Income replacement rate are 50–60 
of recent average wages except in 
China, which pays flat-rate benefits 
below the minimum wage. Iran 
provides a 10 percent benefit 
supplement per dependent for up to 
four dependents. The Republic of 
Korea offers a reemployment bonus 
if claimant leaves unemployment 
before exhausting half of the 
entitlement. Waiting period in the 
Republic of Korea and Taiwan 
(China) is 14 days.  
China: 1–2 years, Republic 
of Korea: 90–240 days, 
based on age of claimant and 
length of previous 
employment (benefits 
extended in special cases); 
Taiwan (China): 6 months; 
Iran: 6–50 months, based on 
employment length and 
marital status 
Insured employment 
requirement: 6 months in Iran, 
1 year in China, 6 months in 
the Republic of Korea, 2 years 
in Taiwan (China). In the 
Republic of Korea and Taiwan 
(China), unemployment must 
be involuntary. In Iran 
unemployment cannot be due 
to misconduct or refusal to 
accept suitable offer. 
Registration at employment 
office required. 
Recipients must be able, 
available, and willing to 
work, and looking for a 
job. In Turkey, job-search 
requirement is not 
effectively imposed.  
In China employers contribute 
0.6–1.0 percent (rate depends 
on local government. 
provisions), the state provides 
subsidies. In Iran employers 
contribute 3 percent, the state  
finances deficit. In the 
Republic of Korea, employers 
contribute 0.5 percent,  
workers 0.5 percent. In Taiwan 
(China), workers contribute 0.2 
percent,  employers 0.7 
percent, and the state covers 
the cost of administration, pays 
0.1 percent of worker wages 
and, if needed, transfers 
resources from other social 
insurance funds. 
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